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ABSTRACT. The literature on volunteering has increased over the last few years.
However, despite the importance of active environmental participation for solving public
good and externality problems, there is still a lack of substantial empirical evidence
regarding several interesting factors that influence this form of volunteering. This
empirical study investigates the area by analyzing a cross-section of individuals from
38 countries using micro-data from wave III of the World Values Survey (1995–1997). The
results suggest that individuals’ active participation in environmental organizations is
related not only to socioeconomic factors but also to political interest. We also find that
a higher level of corruption is related to participation in environmental organizations.
However, the situation is different for transition countries in which there was a collapse
of institutional structures. The energy required to negotiate the ensuing chaos may have
crowded out other forms of engagement.
1. Introduction
While the literature on volunteering has increased over recent years, the
attention paid to specific types of voluntary participation has not kept
For advice and suggestions, thanks are due to Doris Aebi, Jouni Paavola,
the participants at the 2nd Atlantic Workshop on Energy and Environmental
Economics, participants at the 3rd World Congress of Environmental and
Resource Economists (Kyoto), and three anonymous referees.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X11000106
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:38:33, subject to the Cambridge Core
592 Benno Torgler et al.
pace. In particular, voluntary participation in environmental organizations
is an interesting topic yet a surprisingly neglected research area. From an
economics perspective, this type of volunteering holds implications for the
public good of environmental quality and for dealing with externalities, at
least at the local level, where active pro-environmental groups have been
successful in solving certain environmental problems (Pretty and Ward,
2001). Of further interest is the fact that voluntary activities in general
have the advantage of creating social output that would otherwise require
paid resources (Freeman, 1997). The potential advantages of this activity
are reason enough to consider possible determinants of participation
in environmental organizations. Previous literature on the phenomenon
of volunteering in general has suggested that socioeconomic and socio-
demographic factors play a role, especially in determining who has the
time, motivation or opportunity to volunteer. Furthermore, social capital
and institutional quality may also influence the existing conditions or
contexts within which individuals make their decisions to participate in
collective action. In this paper, we extend these ideas and offer an empirical
analysis of voluntary actions designed to preserve the environment.
As is common in this field of work, the concepts and variables are
difficult to disentangle and to measure, and the results are often mixed, but
it is hoped that the process of investigation will offer further clarity. The
analysis of socio-demographic and socioeconomic factors broadly covers
external factors that influence costs of participation (such as age, marital
status, education and economic situation) and internal factors that can
be loosely grouped into some sort of value orientation (namely, political
attitudes, political interest, and participation in other voluntary organiz-
ations). The results on costs of participation are not surprising, and can
explain the reduced participation of women (competing commitments),
and reduced participation of those older than 30. However, the opportunity
costs of time argument is refuted by the negative relationship between
being unemployed and the degree of participation. The interesting element
in these regressions is the link between political interest and participation
in environmental organizations. There is a positive and significant link
between these variables which remains consistent after robustness checks
using an instrumental variable (IV) approach.
The results of the investigation into regional differences revealed
considerable disparity, suggesting that an analysis of the states’ capacities
could be useful in understanding citizens’ involvement in environmental
organizations. Previous literature on the relationship between institutional
quality and corruption supported the possibility of such a process. Our
findings indicate that environmental participation seems to be more
important as a channel for action in developing countries in Latin America
and Asia.
We also find that a higher level of corruption is positively related
to participation in environmental organizations. We provide evidence of
this relationship at the micro level, and at the macro level we find a
strong correlation between corruption or social norms against bribing and
environmental participation. This idea sits in the so-called macro-structural
approach to volunteering (Salamon and Sokolowsky, 2001), which will be
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broadly described in the next section. To this end, we investigate the impact
of perceived corruption on environmental organizations using a cross-
section of individuals and the World Values Survey (WVS) wave III (WVS,
1995–1997) to capture the extent to which citizens are actively participating
in environmental organizations. As far as we know, this is the first time the
topic has been analyzed using WVS data.
Section 2 of the paper introduces the topic and describes some key
factors which have emerged from the results of previous studies in pro-
environmental behaviour, and in volunteering in general. Section 3 then
presents the empirical results introducing the data set, the variables and
the empirical approach. Finally, section 4 finishes with some concluding
remarks.
2. Factors that influence pro-environmental behavior
As outlined in section 1, the factors influencing voluntary pro-
environmental actions range from the socioeconomic and socio-
demographic to the state of institutions, level of perceived corruption
and level of political interest. The following section investigates the
existing literature on these factors.
Our first line of inquiry into the reasons for active, passive or
non-participation in environmental organizations follows the standard
arguments; i.e., that volunteering is influenced by socio-demographic
factors and the ability to participate in networks, either by access to
networks or the costs and benefits of participation. However, Olli et al.
(2001) found that socio-demographic factors explained only around 10 per
cent of pro-environmental acts. Nevertheless, it is important to include
these factors because they serve an important role as control variables
related to the cost of participation. Some of the more usual costs are
the energy and time costs, and these depend on several socioeconomic
features, like age, gender, marital status, education level or income. A
traditional economic approach would suggest that volunteers are more
likely to be individuals with low opportunity costs of time (Menchik
and Weisbrod, 1987). In fact, family issues or financial and employment
commitments act as competing commitments, at odds with participation in
an environmental organization. The extent of competition for the attention
and time of the individual has an effect on the decision to volunteer
(Martinez and McMullin, 2004; Capellari et al., 2007).
Lubell (2002) analyzed the question from a cost/benefit perspective and
found that the expected value of environmental activism depends not
only on the costs of participation, but also on the benefits. In this respect,
two kinds of benefits for the volunteer can be identified (Lubell, 2002).
Ecological activists satisfy personal and social goals at the same time. These
may be linked to political and psychological characteristics and attitudes
and have been labeled as ‘internal or intrinsic factors’ (Kollmuss and
Agyeman, 2002; Cappellari and Turati, 2004). Randle and Dolnicar (2006)
found that environmental volunteers have higher regional identity feelings
than non-volunteers. Extraversion, altruism, solidarity and/or empathic
concern for other people are other factors that matter (Cappellari and
Turati, 2004; Bekkers, 2005; Randle and Dolnicar, 2006). Environmental
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values are significant too, as higher values result in a higher level of
participation in environmental protection (Olli et al., 2001; Lubell, 2002;
Pato and Tamayo, 2006; Randle and Dolnicar, 2006). Lubell (2002) found a
positive relationship between environmental activism and environmental
attitudes. Similarly, Randle and Dolnicar (2006) found that environmental
volunteers present more environmentally friendly attitudes than do non-
volunteers.
We now move away from the factors that could be analyzed using the
cost/benefit framework, and move towards those factors Durlauf (2002:
272) referred to when he criticized the conventional economics view of
‘individual behavior in which the psychological and sociological influences
on individuals are treated as having second order significance’. Some of
these factors are often included under the umbrella of ‘social capital’, a
concept that leads to ‘a “socialised” account of political phenomena – in
contrast to the “under-socialised” explanations offered by both rational
choice theory and behaviourism’ (Lowndes, 2004: 45). Durlauf (2002: 272)
agrees: ‘the attractiveness of social capital arguments stems, I suspect, from
a growing recognition of the limitations of conventional versions of this
choice-based approach’.
Even though the concept of social capital has increased in popularity
over the past decade to become something of an interdisciplinary
household term, the methods by which it is created and the processes and
dynamics by which it is accessed are still disputed. Ambiguity regarding
the direction of causality is inherent in the descriptions, definitions
and measurements. Stiglitz (2000) suggests that social capital can be
seen as knowledge, networks and reputation, enabling communities and
individuals to address the problems of moral hazard and incentives.
Putnam (1993: 167) asserts the importance of social capital for the
effective governance of democracy, and expresses social capital as ‘features
of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’. The
question remains as to whether social capital begets further interaction
or whether propinquity and participation beget further social capital. The
different dimensions of social capital further complicate the discussion,
but most multi-dimensional descriptions are in line with Grootaert and
van Bastelaer’s (2002) work with the Social Capital Assessment Tool
(SOCAT), categorizing social capital into three dimensions: membership in
associations and networks (structural social capital), trust and adherence
to norms (cognitive social capital), and collective action. In some ways,
structural (network) social capital is the most visible dimension of social
capital, as civic groups and the density of membership in voluntary groups
are the least problematic elements to identify and measure.
The link between the network dimension of social capital and political
interest was demonstrated by Bekkers (2005), who found that people more
interested in politics participate more actively in voluntary associations.
Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas (2007) investigate the effect of political interest
on the willingness to pay increased taxes in order to protect the
environment. The rationale was that informed citizens who know about
environmental problems might have stronger environmental attitudes,
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because they are better aware of the possible damage. Thus, it is not
only formal education that should have an impact on the willingness to
accept an increase in taxes, but also the degree of political interest (referred
to as informal education by Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas (2007)). It can
further be assumed that politically interested people are well informed
and have a high level of current knowledge about what is going on
in politics and thus may also be aware of environmental issues and
problems which might also lead to a higher willingness to adopt pro-
environmental behaviours. Gibson and McAllister (2009: 1) argue that
increased interpersonal participation in social groups contributes ‘to social
capital in general and especially to political involvement’. Gibson and
McAllister (2009: 2) continue to argue that:
there is a considerable body of evidence that high levels of social capital
are associated with higher levels of citizen engagement with the institutional
framework of democratic politics. This is expressed in terms of positive
orientations toward government and in higher levels of activity such as voting,
volunteering and contacting.
Grootaert and van Bastelaer’s (2002) conceptualization of social capital
also requires the cognitive or trust dimension for the production
of collective action, which can raise questions of whether the same
characteristic (trust) is responsible for participation in networks. It is at
this point that the direction of causality becomes most confused, and
one of the key questions in the social capital literature is whether the
existence of networks creates trust, or whether the existence of trust is
responsible for networks. The key to answering this question may lie in
the type of network and the level of trust involved with participation in
the network. Networks can be formed through associations with formally
constituted groups as well as non-group-based activities (Stone, 2001).
For example, environmental organizations may be formal or informal.
They may be large environmental organizations such as Greenpeace,
with an established bureaucracy, structure and international presence.
On the other hand, they may be small neighborhood cleanup groups,
which are informally organized to remove weeds from the local waterway.
Furthermore, networks might be formed due to participation in a choral
society or a softball team, or by taking an aerobics class (Uslaner, 2002).
This distinction is relevant for our study. People who volunteer with
environmental organizations are more likely to do so in order to achieve
a locally important collective goal, either restoring or preserving the
environment, and might undertake this volunteering with people who
come from the same local area. Uslaner (2002) addresses the claims that this
type of interaction will produce greater levels of trust in others, and claims
that connections in such local networks will not lead to ‘generalized’ trust,
but may lead to ‘particularized’ trust. The difference between these two
types of trust is explored in detail in Uslaner (2002), but the importance of
the topic necessitates a brief overview here. Particularized or personalized
trust is a variety of trust that takes time to form, and is sometimes
generated through frequent interpersonal interaction with the same
individuals. On the other hand, trust sometimes arises from a general
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knowledge about the people with whom one is interacting, including
knowledge of their incentives and upbringing (Durlauf and Fafchamps,
2004). This is referred to as generalized trust, and it is instantaneously
extended towards other parties, as it already exists in the individual.
Uslaner (2002: 135) states that ‘for most all types of both formal and
informal social contacts, trust is neither a cause nor an effect. People
can form social bonds without drawing on moral resources’. People with
generalized trust are more likely to express political interest and, in general,
are more likely to participate in a whole range of activities; they are
‘joiners’. According to Uslaner, this is because they learned a certain
optimistic worldview from their parents.
Additionally, it is important for individuals to perceive that their
personal environmental acts, and the actions of their institutions, can and
will lead to a successful end. Mohai (1985) distinguished between ‘internal’
and ‘external political efficacy’ or, in Lubell’s (2002) words, ‘personal’
and ‘government efficacy’. He found that the efficacy of participation is
more heavily weighted in the decision to volunteer than other variables.
It is expected that higher levels of internal efficacy may lead people to
participate more actively in environmental organizations (Mohai, 1985;
Lubell, 2002; Martinez and McMullin, 2004).
External political or government efficacy refers to individual perceptions
about the level of public institutions’ responsibility and the response
to citizens’ environmental demands. However, the relationship is not
clear. On one hand, Lubell (2002: 436) pointed out it is expected that
‘citizens who believe that government actors are responsive and have an
important influence on the environment are more likely to participate
in environmental activism’. On the other hand, if people perceive that
institutions and/or government are not able to be trusted, they may try to
achieve environmental aims on their own. Weak and dysfunctional states
may induce people to pursue their goals via the non-governmental sector,
one example of which would be through environmental organizations.
The perceived efficacy or strength of the state is an element of
institutional quality, which is a key factor in facilitating participation
and better collective action outcomes in a similar way to social capital –
that is, by reducing transaction costs, increasing trust, and reinforcing
the efficacy of the network dimension and the cognitive dimension. It is
generally agreed that a functioning institutional framework will include
high quality legal, economic, political and social institutions. Corruption
is a serious impediment to institutional quality, leading to lack of trust
and damaging reciprocity on every level. Insidious corruption involves
the capture of political and economic power for the elites and for those on
the inside of the circle of influence, destroying morale, reciprocity and the
motivation to take collective action in providing any public good, including
environmental protection. Corruption may be minimized formally
through legal and political processes and informally through social
sanctions.
As Paldam (2000) pointed out, corruption is the best available index of
negative social capital. Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) found that corruption
is even more significant than democracy in explaining environmental
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outcomes. Moreover, special interest groups can be another symptom
of corruption or undue influence on policy makers. Formation of
environmental policy is likely to be representative of many other forms of
government decision making, hence Fredriksson and Svensson (2003: 1384,
1401) examine how special interest groups will influence this process. The
authors claim that interaction ‘between corruption and political instability
is important in determination of other forms of economic policy’. The
model predicts that the degree of corruption is the primary factor exerting
influence over the stringency of environmental policy, and producers will
find it less attractive to offer the government a bribe if there is a high
degree of instability making it less likely that the government will remain
in power. Hence even those who wish to bribe the government in order to
receive special treatment will find other ways to have their preferences met
if there is a high degree of political or institutional instability.
If people know the government is corrupt, they know the government is
not going to solve their externality problems. Stiglitz (2000: 223) mentions
that the government could be seen as ‘precisely the mechanism that
individuals have set up to reduce the welfare losses from externalities’,
which suggests that establishing a state with redistributive and legislative
power is in itself an attempt to enable low transaction cost solutions to
social dilemmas.
It seems, therefore, that corruption could result in reduced efficacy
and stringency of public environmental policies, damaging the state of
the environment.1 Hence, if people realize that corruption precludes the
achievement of environmental protection, then it is possible that they
will seek out participation in environmental organizations to pursue that
aim. However, there might be limitations to such an engagement. In
situations where there has been a rapid collapse of the institutional (formal
and informal) and government structure (institutional and social capital
vacuum) environmental participation will be lower. Due to the importance
of institutional and governmental issues, we have additionally focused on
the impact that corruption has on that individual decision.
3. Empirical results
3.1. Methodology
The question of primary interest in this paper relates to environmental
participation and is phrased as follows:
Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you
tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that
type of organization?
Environmental organization
Our dependent or response variable has the value 1 if an individual
is an active member of an environmental organization, otherwise 0.
1 For example, Fredriksson et al. (2004) show that corruption has a negative
impact on energy efficiency in OECD countries. Additionally, Cole (2006) found a
positive direct impact of corruption on per capita emissions.
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Environmental organizations are considered to be all kinds of groups that
aim to conserve natural resources and protect the environment. Thus, it is
possible to find this kind of organization at the local, regional, national,
even international level. However, it may be argued that there is a problem
with using a cross-cultural comparison of environmental organizations,
namely that the perception or reference point for what constitutes an
‘environmental organization’ might differ. Beck (1996) acknowledges that
invoking the idea of ‘nature’ is going to produce disparate results
depending on the social or cultural context. Harper and Brown (2003)
discovered differences in perceptions of what constitutes ‘the environment’
between African Americans and white Americans.
We use a probit model due to the non-linear and binary nature of the
dependent variable. The dependent variable in this analysis is a variable
used to indicate whether individuals are an active member of a voluntary
organization (value 1) or not (value 0). As a linear regression model
is unbounded, the model can produce predicted probabilities that are
negative or exceed unity, which are of course unrealistic. It is also not
possible to arbitrarily constrain the point predictions outside the unit
interval to either 0 or 1 as the error term would not satisfy the assumption
of homoskedasticity. A probit model allows us to solve these problems by
implementing a non-linear function that takes on values strictly between
zero and one. As the estimated probit coefficients are based on a non-linear
estimation technique, we cannot readily interpret the coefficients in terms
of the quantitative sizes of the effects. We therefore calculate the marginal
effects at the multivariate point of means to find the quantitative effect of
an independent variable. The marginal effect indicates the change in the
share of individuals (or the probability of) belonging actively to a voluntary
environmental organization, when the independent variable increases by
one unit. If the independent variable is a dummy variable, the marginal
effect is evaluated with regard to the reference group.
To obtain robust standard errors, we use the Huber/White/Sandwich
estimators of standard errors. We also check the robustness using
standard errors adjusted for the clustering on countries, thus taking into
account unobservable country-specific characteristics. Clustering leads to
a decrease in the z-values, but has no impact on the marginal effects. The
results remain robust when clustering.
A weighting variable has been applied to correct the samples and
thus to obtain a reflection of the national distribution. In other words,
the weighting variable corrects for obvious deviations from national
population parameters in age and education. The surveys from most
low-income countries undersample the illiterate portion of the public
and oversample the urban areas and the more educated strata. The
weighting variable corrects for these and other features of sampling.
In the estimations where several countries are pooled, an additional
weighting variable has been integrated. The original weight variable has
been multiplied by a constant for each country to get an equal number of
weighted observations (around 1,500) for each survey. The WVS provides
the weighting variables (Inglehart et al., 2000). Furthermore, ‘I don’t
know’ answers and missing values were omitted from all estimations. A
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variables Observations Mean SD
PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL 67478 0.035 –
ORGANIZATION
AGE 30–49 61015 0.429 –
AGE 50–64 61015 0.181 –
AGE 65+ 61015 0.099 –
FEMALE 68735 0.518 –
UPPER EDUCATION 65722 0.199 –
MIDDLE EDUCATION 65722 0.544 –
MARRIED 65630 0.602 –
FINANCIAL SATISFACTION 65006 5.235 2.750
UPPER CLASS 64382 0.018 –
SELF-EMPLOYED 65388 0.098 –
UNEMPLOYED 65388 0.093 –
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS 63520 2.320 0.947
DISCUSSING POLITICS 64627 1.849 0.654
INTEREST IN POLITICS 67349 2.279 0.955
CORRUPTION 59078 2.936 0.826
NORM OF BRIBING 67366 2.460 1.026
OTHER VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 60405 0.374 0.484
IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY 68569 3.857 0.405
IMPORTANCE OF LEISURE 67706 3.074 0.808
IMPORTANCE OF WORK 67937 3.549 0.700
CHILDREN 51559 2.370 1.537
GENERALIZED TRUST 67484 0.247 –
possible criticism of this method is that these missing values could provide
valuable information that should be taken into account. This certainly
may be a problem if there is a large set of missing values. However, the
descriptive statistics in the appendix (see table A1, available in the online
appendix at http://journals.cambridge.org/EDE) show ‘don’t know’ and
missing values of our dependent variable for each country (USA has
the largest number of missing values at 1%). Hence, the variable has
hardly any missing values, so it is relatively safe to omit them. Table 1
provides the descriptive statistics of all the variables, and shows that
there are differences regarding the number of observations. For example,
CORRUPTION and AGE have lower number of observations than other
factors. However, taking into account the number of countries in the
sample, missing values seem not be a serious concern. Moreover, one
should note that the variable CHILDREN (lowest number of observations)
has been added sequentially in the estimations.
3.2. Data and variables
Data used in the present study are taken from the WVS, a worldwide
investigation of socio-cultural and political change, based on representative
national samples. It was first carried out in 1981–1983, and subsequently
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in 1990, 1995, 1999–2001 and 2005.2 Data from these surveys are made
publicly available for use by researchers interested in how views change
with time. The interesting aspect in this paper is the use of a behavioral
variable instead of an attitudinal one to investigate environmental
involvement or environmental preferences. Moreover, we decided to use
the WVS data as it covers a broad variety of countries and variables which
allow a detailed investigation of the determinants of participating actively
in environmental organizations at the micro level.
Countries with fewer than 750 observations (Montenegro, the Domin-
ican Republic, Ghana, Pakistan and Tambov) were excluded from the
sample to reduce possible biases due to a lack of representativeness.
Finally, Sweden could not be included as one of the control variables
(EDUCATION) is coded differently. We proceed with a sample of 38
countries.3 The estimations are also performed for various geographic sub-
samples to compare the relevance of our independent variables in different
environments.4
We have chosen the independent variables based on the previous
literature on pro-environmental behaviors and volunteerism presented
in section 2. First of all, we consider several socio-demographic and
economic variables. This allows us to focus firstly on ‘external’ factors
which influence the costs of participation. In a second step we include
political attitudes using three different proxies to check the robustness.
Next we are going to explore whether active participation in other
voluntary organizations is correlated with participation in environmental
organizations. As previously discussed, a traditional economic approach
would suggest that volunteers would mostly be individuals with low
opportunity costs of time (Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987). We therefore
control in further estimations for the number of children and the
importance of work, leisure and family. Tables 1 and 2 in this paper and
table A1 in the online appendix provide descriptions of the variables used.
This also allows measurement of time devoted at work or at home. Time
devoted to volunteering can be seen as an alternative to other activities
(work in the market, work at home, and leisure).
Instead of using AGE as a continuous variable, we use four dummy
variables for age cohorts. GENDER and MARITAL STATUS are additional
dummy variables. From the results of previous studies no clear prediction
can be formulated, but preferences for protecting the environment and
time or physical restrictions should have opposite effects. Education may
also be a variable of interest, and may have a positive impact. We include
2 Although WVS has been used to analyze volunteerism in several countries
(see, among others, Dekker and Halman (2003) or Haddad (2007)), none of the
previous work has focused on active environmental participation.
3 In the sample, both developing and developed countries are included, although
we have fewer developing countries. However, we have considered a broader
group of countries that do not have a very low income but with several wellbeing
deficits and strong social inequalities (e.g., transition countries).
4 A list of all the countries that were ultimately included is shown in table A1 (see
online appendix).
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Table 2. Description of variables
Variable Description
AGE DUMMIES: AGE 30–49; AGE 50–64; 65+ (reference group, AGE < 30)
GENDER FEMALE (MALE in the reference group)
EDUCATION What is the highest educational level that you have attained (DUMMIES)?
LOWER EDUCATION (no formal education; incomplete primary school; completed primary school)
MIDDLE EDUCATION (incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type; complete
secondary school: technical/vocational type; incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type;
complete secondary: university-preparatory type)
UPPER EDUCATION (some university-level education, without degree; university-level education,
with degree)
MARITAL STATUS DUMMY: MARRIED = 1, all other classes (divorced, separated, widowed, single) in the reference
group
FINANCIAL
SATISFACTION
How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? (scale 1 = dissatisfied to 10 =
satisfied)
ECONOMIC CLASS People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the
upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:
DUMMY: UPPER CLASS, the rest (middle class, working class and lower class) is the reference group
EMPLOYMENT STATUS TWO DUMMIES: SELF-EMPLOYED, UNEMPLOYED, the rest (part-time employed, at home,
student, retired, other) is in the reference group
CORRUPTION To assess the level of perceived corruption from the WVS, we use the following question:
How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country?
Almost no public officials are engaged in it (1)
A few public officials are engaged in it (2)
Most public officials are engaged in it (3)
Almost all public officials are engaged in it (4)
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Table 2. Continued.
Variable Description
NORM AGAINST BRIBING Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be
justified, or something in between: (. . .) someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties (1 =
always justified; 10 = never justified). We recode the variable into a 4-point scale (0, 1, 2, 3), with the
value 3 standing for ‘never justified’. Responses 4 through 10 were combined into a value 0 due to a
lack of variance among them
IMPORTANCE OF
POLITICS
How important is politics in your life? (1 = not at all important; 2 = not very important; 3 = rather
important; 4 = very important)
DISCUSSING POLITICS When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently,
occasionally or never? (3 = frequently; 2 = occasionally; 1 = never)
INTEREST IN POLITICS How interested would you say you are in politics? (4 = very interested; 3 = somewhat interested; 2 =
not very interested; 1 = not at all interested)
OTHER VOLUNTARY
PARTICIPATION
1 if active member of the following voluntary organizations: church or religious organization, sport or
recreation organization, art, music or educational organization, labor union, political party,
professional association, charitable organization, any other organization (0 = inactive member or not
belonging to these organizations)
IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY How important is family in your life? (1 = not at all important; 2 = not very important; 3 = rather
important; 4 = very important)
IMPORTANCE OF LEISURE How important is leisure in your life? (1 = not at all important; 2 = not very important; 3 = rather
important; 4 = very important)
IMPORTANCE OF WORK How important is work in your life? (1 = not at all important; 2 = not very important; 3 = rather
important; 4 = very important)
CHILDREN Number of children
GENERALIZED TRUST Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people? (1 = most people can be trusted) (0 = can’t be too careful)
Source: Inglehart et al. (2000).
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dummy variables representative of different education levels (MIDDLE
EDUCATION, UPPER EDUCATION and LOWER EDUCATION in the
reference group).5
As a proxy for income we use the economic situation of an individual
(dummy variable for UPPER CLASS with the remaining individuals in
the reference group). Using the exact income would produce biases,
because this variable is not comparable across different countries.6 It may
be the case that higher income individuals have a greater demand for
environmental quality, but on the other hand, the opportunity cost of
their time may be very high. Furthermore, we control for FINANCIAL
SATISFACTION (scale 1 = dissatisfied to 10 = satisfied). Participation
may depend on the perceived restrictions of an individual. If a person is
not satisfied with her financial situation, she has a stronger incentive to
spend more time and resources in the accumulation of additional wealth
rather than spending time in voluntary organizations. This allows us to
get a second proxy for individuals’ wellbeing. Interestingly, there is a low
correlation between financial satisfaction and being rich (r = 0.07).
Finally, another variable that approximates the economic situation of
individuals is their occupational status (EMPLOYMENT STATUS). On
the one hand, self-employed people may have higher opportunity costs
of being in a voluntary organization. On the other hand, it may allow
establishing connections that could positively influence their business.
Thus, it is not possible to derive a clear prediction. There is a low positive
correlation between being self-employed and being rich (r = 0.01) and
between being self-employed and financial satisfaction (r = 0.05).
In most of the estimations we also include regional dummy variables
for the CEE and FSU (Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet
Union countries), LATIN AMERICA, ASIA and AFRICA, leaving the
industrialized economies of WESTERN EUROPE, USA, and AUSTRALIA
in the reference group.
In a first step we only included ‘external’ factors. Thus, we have avoided
including preferences and values in the model. We are aware that such
an approach has its limitations and that it does not provide a complete
picture of the determinants of environmental engagement. Thus, in a
second step, we include political characteristics. Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas
(2007), for example, have shown that political interest has a positive
correlation with pro-environmental preferences. We use several proxies to
check the robustness of the results (level of: IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS,
DISCUSSING POLITICS and INTEREST IN POLITICS). This issue is also
linked to the network dimension of social capital. In this respect, Putnam
(2001: 19) cites one of the first and best descriptions of social capital written
in 1916 by L.J. Hanifan:
those tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of people:
namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the
5 See table 2 for an overview of the coding.
6 In the survey, individuals are asked about the economic class they think they
belong to.
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individuals and families who make up a social unit. . . . The individual is
helpless socially, if left to himself. . . . If he comes into contact with his neighbor,
and they with other neighbors, there will be an accumulation of social capital,
which may immediately satisfy this social need and which may bear a social
potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in
the whole community.
Thus, it can be suggested that people who think that politics is important
in their lives (politically interested people) engage in intensive social
interactions and, as a consequence, they are well informed and have a
high level of current knowledge about what is going on in politics and
thus may also be aware of environmental issues. Compared to other
determinants, the aspect of political interest has been widely neglected in
the environmental literature. Figure A1 (see online appendix) illustrates
that societies’ perceived importance of politics is highly positively
correlated with active environmental participation (Pearson r = 0.362). This
descriptive analysis gives information about the raw effects at the macro
level. We will check in a next step the robustness of these results in the
multivariate analysis to get the partial effects at the micro level.
To analyze the states’ capacities regarding environmental participation
and implementation of public policies in general, we require a variable
that reflects the link between institutional issues and participation. The
perceived level of corruption is used for this purpose. Woolcock (1998:
187) points out that the ‘structure of the state, the nature and extent
of its involvement in civic and corporate life, and the organization of
society together constitute the key factors determining whether a country
succeeds or fails in development’. Hence, in the WVS, individuals are
asked about the level of perceived corruption (CORRUPTION). One
way to test whether the WVS question about corruption is a useful
proxy is to check whether the variable is correlated with other well
known indexes on corruption. Thus, we compare our variable with
the corruption indexes TI (Transparency International), International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Quality of Government (Control of
Corruption) developed by Kaufmann et al. (2003). Our index is in line with
other indexes such as the Transparency International that also measure
perceptions. The WVS Corruption ratings are highly correlated with the
TI (r = −0.878), the ICRG (r = −0.680) and the Quality of Government
rating (r = −0.827). Additionally, in order to test the robustness of
the results related to perceived corruption, we consider an additional
variable (NORM AGAINST BRIBING). This variable asked individuals
about the justifiability of bribing. The justifiability of bribing variable is
also positively correlated with former indexes, e.g., TI CPI correlation
coefficient is 0.358 and Control of Corruption (Quality of Government):
0.380.
3.3. Empirical evidence
This section reports the main results (see tables 3–6 and tables A2 and A3 in
the online appendix). In each table, several specifications have been shown.
The main differences among specifications consist of the variables included
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Table 3. Determinants of environmental participation
WEIGHTED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Effects Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Effects Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Effects
Specifications (1) (2) (3)
Clustering on countries
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
a) Demographic factors
AGE 30–49 −0.030 −0.92 −0.002 −0.030 −0.77 −0.002 0.020 0.60 0.001
AGE 50–64 −0.060 −1.48 −0.004 −0.060 −0.97 −0.004 0.061 1.44 0.003
AGE 65+ −0.268∗∗∗ −4.57 −0.014 −0.268∗∗∗ −2.68 −0.014 −0.102∗ −1.69 −0.005
FEMALE −0.133∗∗∗ −5.17 −0.009 −0.133∗∗∗ −3.83 −0.009 −0.146∗∗∗ −5.57 −0.008
MIDDLE EDUCATION 0.003 0.10 0.000 0.003 0.04 0.000 0.144∗∗∗ 4.12 0.008
UPPER EDUCATION 0.205∗∗∗ 5.27 0.015 0.205∗ 1.92 0.015 0.355∗∗∗ 9.08 0.024
b) Marital status
MARRIED −0.031 −1.07 −0.002 −0.031 −0.94 −0.002 −0.015 −0.51 −0.001
c) Economic variables
FINANCIAL SATISFACTION 0.061∗∗∗ 11.65 0.004 0.061∗∗∗ 6.65 0.004 0.033∗∗∗ 5.83 0.002
UPPER CLASS 0.179∗ 1.93 0.014 0.179 1.37 0.014 0.199∗∗ 2.05 0.013
d) Employment status
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.223∗∗∗ 5.78 0.017 0.223∗∗ 2.39 0.017 0.039 0.99 0.002
UNEMPLOYED −0.048 −1.01 −0.003 −0.048 −0.93 −0.003 −0.046 −0.92 −0.002
e) Regions
CEE and FSU −0.455∗∗∗ −11.16 −0.023
LATIN AMERICA 0.188∗∗∗ 5.17 0.011
ASIA 0.200∗∗∗ 5.42 0.013
AFRICA 0.968∗∗∗ 13.87 0.125
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Table 3. Continued
WEIGHTED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Effects Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Effects Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Effects
Specifications (1) (2) (3)
Clustering on countries
Pseudo R2 0.0322 0.0322 0.0829
Number of observations 48,362 48,362 48,362
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Robust standard errors and standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries. In the reference group are AGE < 30,
MALE, LOWER EDUCATION, OTHER MARITAL STATUS, OTHER CLASSES, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, WESTERN
EUROPE + USA + AUSTRALIA.
Significance levels: ∗0.05 < p < 0.10, ∗∗0.01< p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
CEE, Central Eastern European countries; FSU, Former Soviet Union countries.
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Table 4. Environmental participation and political interest
WEIGHTED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Effects Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Effects Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Effects
Specifications (4) (5) (6)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
a) Demographic factors
AGE 30–49 0.001 0.02 0.000 0.002 0.06 0.000 0.014 0.41 0.001
AGE 50–64 0.028 0.65 0.001 0.034 0.79 0.002 0.048 1.12 0.003
AGE 65+ −0.119∗∗ −1.93 −0.006 −0.119∗ −1.92 −0.006 −0.112∗ −1.82 −0.005
FEMALE −0.117∗∗∗ −4.30 −0.006 −0.116∗∗∗ −4.27 −0.006 −0.138∗∗∗ −5.15 −0.007
MIDDLE EDUCATION 0.094∗∗∗ 2.61 0.005 0.111∗∗∗ 3.12 0.006 0.123∗∗∗ 3.45 0.006
UPPER EDUCATION 0.267∗∗∗ 6.54 0.016 0.290∗∗∗ 7.19 0.018 0.307∗∗∗ 7.67 0.020
b) Marital status
MARRIED −0.013 −0.42 −0.001 −0.017 −0.54 −0.001 −0.013 −0.42 −0.001
c) Economic variables
FINANCIAL SATISFACTION 0.033∗∗∗ 5.70 0.002 0.034∗∗∗ 5.91 0.002 0.033∗∗∗ 5.66 0.002
UPPER CLASS 0.195∗∗ 1.95 0.012 0.207∗∗ 2.07 0.013 0.198∗∗ 2.00 0.013
d) Employment status
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.017 0.41 0.001 0.039 0.99 0.002 0.023 0.58 0.001
UNEMPLOYED −0.059 −1.16 −0.003 −0.043 −0.86 −0.002 −0.056 −1.11 −0.003
e) Regions
CEE and FSU −0.415∗∗∗ −10.00 −0.021 −0.448∗∗∗ −10.92 −0.023 −0.437∗∗∗ −10.52 −0.022
LATIN AMERICA 0.278∗∗∗ 7.29 0.017 0.226∗∗∗ 6.08 0.014 0.214∗∗∗ 5.81 0.013
ASIA 0.288∗∗∗ 7.31 0.019 0.208∗∗∗ 5.52 0.013 0.183∗∗∗ 4.88 0.011
AFRICA 0.988∗∗∗ 14.48 0.126 0.989∗∗∗ 14.07 0.128 0.941∗∗∗ 13.49 0.117
f) Political interest
INTEREST IN POLITICS 0.153∗∗∗ 9.65 0.008
DISCUSSING POLITICS 0.174∗∗∗ 7.93 0.009
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS 0.116∗∗∗ 8.12 0.006
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etal.Table 4. Continued
WEIGHTED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Effects Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Effects Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Effects
Specifications (4) (5) (6)
Pseudo R2 0.0953 0.0886 0.0899
Number of observations 46,500 47,547 47,432
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Robust standard errors. In the reference group are AGE < 30, MALE, LOWER EDUCATION, OTHER MARITAL STATUS,
OTHER CLASSES, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, WESTERN EUROPE + USA + AUSTRALIA.
Significance levels: ∗0.05 < p < 0.10, ∗∗0.01< p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
CEE, Central Eastern European countries; FSU, Former Soviet Union countries.
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Table 5. Volunteering and opportunity costs
WEIGHTED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
effects Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
effects Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
effects
Specifications (10) (11) (12)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
a) Demographic factors
AGE 30–49 0.011 0.28 0.000 0.012 0.32 0.000 −0.146∗∗∗ −3.00 −0.005
AGE 50–64 0.018 0.38 0.001 0.010 0.22 0.000 −0.159∗∗∗ −2.72 −0.004
AGE 65+ −0.114∗ −1.64 −0.003 −0.112 −1.57 −0.003 −0.280∗∗∗ −3.20 −0.007
FEMALE −0.105∗∗∗ −3.53 −0.004 −0.105∗∗∗ −3.50 −0.004 −0.147∗∗∗ −4.12 −0.005
MIDDLE EDUCATION 0.031 0.78 0.001 0.031 0.78 0.001 0.046 1.01 0.001
UPPER EDUCATION 0.152∗∗∗ 3.46 0.006 0.152∗∗∗ 3.45 0.006 0.173∗∗∗ 3.40 0.006
b) Marital status
MARRIED −0.009 −0.27 0.000 −0.011 −0.31 0.000 −0.054 −1.25 −0.002
c) Economic variables
FINANCIAL SATISFACTION 0.024∗∗∗ 3.77 0.001 0.024 3.79 0.001 0.027∗∗∗ 3.68 0.001
UPPER CLASS 0.117 1.13 0.004 0.123 1.18 0.005 0.046 0.42 0.002
d) Employment status
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.009 0.19 0.000 0.007 0.16 0.000 −0.014 −0.27 0.000
UNEMPLOYED −0.032 −0.58 −0.001 −0.026 −0.47 −0.001 −0.005 −0.07 0.000
e) Regions
CEE and FSU −0.185∗∗∗ −3.88 −0.006 −0.182∗∗∗ −3.79 −0.006 −0.137∗∗ −2.40 −0.004
LATIN AMERICA 0.253∗∗∗ 6.26 0.010 0.238∗∗∗ 5.77 0.010 0.260∗∗∗ 5.13 0.010
ASIA 0.387∗∗∗ 8.82 0.018 0.386∗∗∗ 8.44 0.018 0.400∗∗∗ 7.40 0.018
AFRICA 0.785∗∗∗ 10.96 0.061 0.778∗∗∗ 10.75 0.060 0.774∗∗∗ 8.11 0.055
f) Political interest
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS 0.076∗∗∗ 4.87 0.003 0.073∗∗∗ 4.55 0.003 0.080∗∗∗ 4.25 0.002
g) Volunteering
OTHER VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 0.996∗∗∗ 26.16 0.052 0.993∗∗∗ 25.98 0.052 1.014∗∗∗ 22.41 0.051
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Table 5. Continued
WEIGHTED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
effects Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
effects Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
effects
Specifications (10) (11) (12)
h) Opportunity costs/preferences for alternative activities
IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY 0.009 0.23 0.000 −0.080 −1.55 −0.002
IMPORTANCE OF LEISURE 0.012 0.59 0.000 0.021 0.91 0.001
IMPORTANCE OF WORK 0.026 1.06 0.001 0.010 0.34 0.000
CHILDREN 0.027∗∗ 2.16 0.001
Pseudo R2 0.1839 0.1828 0.1952
Number of observations 44,716 43,844 33,442
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Robust standard errors. In the reference group are AGE < 30, MALE, LOWER EDUCATION, OTHER MARITAL STATUS,
OTHER CLASSES, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, WESTERN EUROPE + USA + AUSTRALIA, NOT ACTIVE IN VOLUNTARY
ORGANIZATIONS.
Significance levels: ∗0.05 < p < 0.10, ∗∗0.01< p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
CEE, Central Eastern European countries; FSU, Former Soviet Union countries.
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Table 6. Environmental participation and perceived corruption
WEIGHTED Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
Effects Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
Effects Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
Effects Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
Effects Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
Effects
Specifications (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
WITHOUT NIGERIA WITH NIGERIA
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
a) Demographic factors
AGE 30–49 −0.012 −0.30 0.000 −0.041 −1.07 −0.002 0.013 0.34 0.000 0.015 0.38 0.001 −0.140∗∗∗ −2.79 −0.005
AGE 50–64 −0.029 −0.60 −0.001 −0.076 −1.60 −0.003 0.034 0.71 0.001 0.031 0.64 0.001 −0.136∗∗ −2.25 −0.004
AGE 65+ −0.172∗∗ −2.41 −0.005 −0.248∗∗∗ −3.46 −0.008 −0.092 −1.27 −0.003 −0.083 −1.12 −0.003 −0.255∗∗∗ −2.82 −0.007
FEMALE −0.118∗∗∗ −3.81 −0.004 −0.100∗∗∗ −3.27 −0.004 −0.116∗∗∗ −3.76 −0.004 −0.115∗∗∗ −3.71 −0.004 −0.152∗∗∗ −4.14 −0.005
MIDDLE EDUCATION −0.002 −0.06 0.000 −0.067 −1.61 −0.003 0.026 0.64 0.001 0.028 0.69 0.001 0.044 0.95 0.001
UPPER EDUCATION 0.113∗∗∗ 2.46 0.004 0.031 0.68 0.001 0.150∗∗∗ 3.31 0.006 0.150∗∗∗ 3.30 0.006 0.170∗∗∗ 3.24 0.006
b) Marital status
MARRIED 0.009 0.27 0.000 0.002 0.05 0.000 −0.011 −0.31 0.000 −0.012 −0.34 0.000 −0.059 −1.32 −0.002
c) Economic variables
FINANCIAL
SATISFACTION
0.034∗∗∗ 5.38 0.001 0.036∗∗∗ 5.68 0.001 0.024∗∗∗ 3.70 0.001 0.024∗∗∗ 3.66 0.001 0.026∗∗∗ 3.46 0.001
UPPER CLASS 0.121 1.05 0.005 0.141 1.36 0.006 0.131 1.23 0.005 0.137 1.27 0.006 0.078 0.70 0.003
d) Employment status
SELF-EMPLOYED 0.074 1.56 0.003 0.159∗∗∗ 3.52 0.007 −0.005 −0.11 0.000 −0.008 −0.16 0.000 −0.031 −0.58 −0.001
UNEMPLOYED −0.078 −1.32 −0.003 −0.052 −0.92 −0.002 −0.086 −1.48 −0.003 −0.080 −1.37 −0.003 −0.066 −0.89 −0.002
e) Regions
TRANSITION
COUNTRIES
−0.221∗∗∗ −4.35 −0.007 −0.222∗∗∗ −4.35 −0.008 −0.177∗∗∗ −2.94 −0.006
LATIN AMERICA 0.233∗∗∗ 5.43 0.010 0.218∗∗∗ 4.99 0.009 0.241∗∗∗ 4.56 0.009
ASIA 0.362∗∗∗ 7.92 0.017 0.358∗∗∗ 7.55 0.017 0.377∗∗∗ 6.78 0.017
AFRICA 0.769∗∗∗ 10.04 0.060 0.760∗∗∗ 9.86 0.060 0.773∗∗∗ 7.71 0.057
f) Political interest
IMPORTANCE OF
POLITICS
0.077∗∗∗ 4.55 0.003 0.091∗∗∗ 5.49 0.004 0.070∗∗∗ 4.32 0.002 0.068∗∗∗ 4.12 0.002 0.074∗∗∗ 3.80 0.002
g) Institutional quality
CORRUPTION 0.073∗∗∗ 3.92 0.003 0.086∗∗∗ 4.64 0.003 0.051∗∗∗ 2.63 0.002 0.051∗∗∗ 2.61 0.002 0.044∗ 1.90 0.001
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Table 6. Continued
WEIGHTED Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
Effects Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
Effects Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
Effects Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
Effects Coeff. z-Stat.
Marg.
Effects
Specifications (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
WITHOUT NIGERIA WITH NIGERIA
f) Volunteering
OTHER
VOLUNTARY
PART.
1.046∗∗∗ 26.74 0.060 1.067∗∗∗ 27.97 0.065 0.991∗∗∗ 25.04 0.052 0.985∗∗∗ 24.81 0.052 0.998∗∗∗ 21.41 0.051
h) Opportunity costs/preferences for alternative activities
IMPORTANCE
OF FAMILY
0.003 0.07 0.000 −0.091∗ −1.69 −0.003
IMPORTANCE
OF LEISURE
0.013 0.64 0.000 0.023 0.96 0.001
IMPORTANCE
OF WORK
0.030 1.20 0.001 0.014 0.48 0.000
CHILDREN 0.025∗∗ 1.96 0.001
Pseudo R2 0.1514 0.1563 0.1813 0.1798 0.1907
Number of
observations
39,451 41,124 41,124 40,379 30,734
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Robust standard errors. In the reference group are AGE < 30, MALE, LOWER EDUCATION, OTHER MARITAL
STATUS, OTHER CLASSES, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, WESTERN EUROPE + USA + AUSTRALIA, NOT ACTIVE IN
VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS.
Significance levels: ∗0.05 < p < 0.10, ∗∗0.01< p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
CEE and FSU countries not included.
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for each one. The primary objective is to investigate the robustness of our
key independent variables.
At this point in the analysis, it is valid to question the appropriateness
of using a single question rather than an index to proxy the level of
participation. We believe that the advantage of using one single question is
that problems arising due to the complexity of an index can be eliminated,
especially regarding the measurement procedure or a low correlation
between the items. We also observe that many studies on environmental
attitudes typically measure environmental values using a single item,7 as
do several studies on volunteering (Cappellari and Turati, 2004; Bekkers,
2005).
Table 3 presents the first results using the entire panel of countries.
We observe that all age groups from 30 to 65+ report a significantly
lower probability of participation in environmental organizations than
the reference group below 30. However, only the coefficient AGE 65+ is
statistically significant in the first two estimations, showing a negative
correlation. This may mean that older people face certain barriers to active
participation, for example, because they might be less physically able to
work in environmental organizations. Active participation would at times
require considerable effort, so there is a higher probability that older people
will experience physical limitations and health problems. Interestingly,
women report a lower probability of participating in environmental
organizations, reduced by almost 1 per cent (see all three specifications).
A positive relation between formal education and environmental parti-
cipation can be observed. People with an UPPER EDUCATION are around
1.4 per cent more likely to participate in environmental organizations.
Similarly, there is a positive correlation between the economic variables
and participation in voluntary environmental organizations. An increase
in financial satisfaction is positively associated with environmental
participation. Only in the second estimation does the coefficient UPPER
CLASS lose its statistical significance, but in general the marginal effects
are not small. Being a member of the upper class is positively correlated
with active environmental participation. There is also the tendency for self-
employed persons to show a higher level of participation in environmental
organizations. However, when including a dummy for each region (in the
third specification), the coefficient loses its significance, which indicates
that we may expect cultural differences. On the other hand, the coefficient
UNEMPLOYED has a negative sign and is not statistically significant
even though it could be argued that unemployed individuals’ opportunity
costs of participating in voluntary organizations are lower. Our findings
provide hardly any empirical foundation for the theoretical argument that
participation depends on individuals’ opportunity costs of time. However,
we will explore this question in a better manner in table 5.
We also find regional differences in terms of participating in
environmental organizations (see specification 3). Interestingly, inhabitants
of LATIN AMERICA, ASIA and AFRICA show a higher probability
7 For a review see, e.g., Zelezny et al. (2000).
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of participation in voluntary environmental organizations than those of
Western societies. Only the coefficients CEE and FSU show a statistically
significant negative sign with relatively high marginal effects of 2.3 per
cent. The results support the argument of Dekker and Van den Broek (1998:
16) who stress that in the West there ‘is the widespread concern about the
presumed decline in social and political engagement in Western society,
which is claimed to affect volunteering too’.
However, the authors also stress that against such a pessimistic
interpretation it can be argued that individualistic concepts of self-
realization and responsibility might also stimulate pro-social behavior. The
low participation in CEE and FSU is no surprise. It can be seen as an
indicator of the transition process, where the socioeconomic conditions
confronting the citizens suddenly deteriorated on a massive scale and the
level and quality of life declined even further. However, the regional results
should be interpreted with caution as the number of countries in each
region is limited.
In table 4 we extend the previous model, including three different
measurements of importance of politics or political interest, including one
behavioral variable (degree of political discussion). One of the key findings
in this study is the fact that political interest is highly correlated with
the willingness to contribute. This is consistent with the macro results
obtained in figure A1 (see online appendix). This result is confirmed when
using two further proxies (IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS and INTEREST
IN POLITICS, and see specifications 4 and 7). Thus, we have to go beyond
formal education and include individuals’ interest for current political
matters. This aspect has been neglected in many previous studies. It is
worthwhile to mention that the impact of the variable EDUCATION is not
affected by the inclusion of political characteristics.
Figures A2 and A3 (see online appendix) provide an outline of who is
interested in politics. Figure A2 shows a non-linear relationship between
political interest and age. Political interest increases with age, reaching
the top for the age group 50–64. After that, political interest decreases.
Moreover, figure A3 indicates that richer people are more interested in
politics than other individuals. We also observe a positive relationship
between education and political interest. However, the correlation is
not that high (r = 0.2). Thus, it seems for these two variables that
the individual characteristics driving the process of volunteering to
environmental organizations are similar to those driving the process of
political participation. The question remains whether this is the case
for further variables and whether we may face a potential endogeneity
problem.
We therefore present (in table A2 in the online appendix) three two-stage
least squares (2SLS) estimations, together with the first-stage regressions
also providing several diagnostic tests to deal with a potential causality
problem. Comparing the first-stage regressions with dependent political
interest variables with our estimations using environmental participation
as dependent variable will also give us insights into whether in fact
similar individual characteristics driving the process of volunteering to
environmental organizations are also driving the process of political
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participation. We will use GENERALIZED TRUST as an instrument for
political interest. There is hardly any correlation between generalized trust
and environmental participation (r = 0.015). Trust in others may facilitate
communication among individuals. It reduces the costs of discussing
political issues. In other words, trust actively augments the ability to
acquire political information at lower costs and helps to increase the
individual incentive to be informed and to discuss political issues. The
three first-stage regressions show that there is a strong correlation between
generalized trust and political interest. Moreover, the results in table A2
also indicate that the political interest variables remain highly statistically
significant in all the 2SLS. The results of the Anderson canonical correlation
likelihood-ratio show that the null hypothesis can be rejected, indicating
that the model is identified and the instrument seemed to be relevant in all
cases. Table A2 further shows that the F-tests for the instrument exclusion
set in the first-stage regression are statistically significant in all cases.
In table 5 we analyze further factors. First we add in specification (10), a
variable that measures whether active volunteering in other organizations
is correlated with voluntary participation in environmental organizations
(see table 3). The results in specifications (10) to (12) clearly indicate that
there is a strong correlation between active participation in environmental
organizations and other voluntary organizations. In specification (11) we
add three variables that may indicate individuals’ opportunity costs of par-
ticipation in environmental organizations (importance of work, family and
leisure). In addition, we explore in specification (12) whether the number of
children is associated with individuals’ participation. We add this variable
sequentially in the specification due to large number of missing values.
We do not observe that the individuals’ perceived importance of work,
leisure and family is correlated with environmental participation. Children,
on the other hand, do not seem to restrict individuals from participating
in environmental organization. On the contrary, we actually observe a
positive relationship, although the marginal effect is very small.
The results obtained in previous tables showed that inhabitants of the
developing continents were more likely to participate in environmental
organizations than those living in Western societies. This is visible for Latin
America, Asia and Africa. It could be that good governance may ‘crowd
out’ other institutions or organizations due to the complementarities
between these elements of society. It may be that the presence of one
institution undermines the functioning of another (Bowles, 2004), or even
the need of another. On the other hand, the low participation in CEE
and FSU is no surprise. It can be seen as an indicator of the transition
process, where the socioeconomic conditions confronting the citizens
suddenly deteriorated on a massive scale and quality of life declined
even further. The rapid collapse of institutional structures produced a
vacuum in these countries, followed by worsening income inequality and
poverty rates (Alm et al., 2006). In such an institutional vacuum there are
diminished incentives to participate in environmental organizations over
other (primarily material and survival-oriented) considerations. According
to Fidrmuc and Gërxhani (2005: 6), ‘the gap, created by the sudden
destruction of old institutions and the creation of new ones, provided
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a favorable environment for the persistence or even accumulation of
“negative” social capital throughout transition’.
We consider the possibility that environmental participation is used as
an alternative channel through which people might pursue their goals.
In developing regions of Latin America or Asia, weak and dysfunctional
states could precipitate such activities in the non-governmental sector.
It is therefore useful to explore whether there is a positive link
between corruption and environmental participation. It may be argued
that perceived corruption relates more to the current politico-economic
conditions, where there is still some level of institutional regime in place. It
is still possible for individuals to organize themselves to solve collective
action problems. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004: 10) stress that, in poor
countries, there are many situations in which the state could, theoretically,
intervene to provide a public good, but where it is unable to do so because
its tax base and its capacity to organize are limited. Collective action
can serve as a substitute for the state. Two essential ingredients are then
required: leadership and trust. A leader is required who is capable of
convincing community members that they should voluntarily contribute
to the public good. Trust is necessary to resolve conflicts among competing
interests and to reduce fears of ‘free-riding’. Our previous results indicate
that trust acts as a mediator to increase political interest which then shapes
environmental participation. Figure A4 (see online appendix) shows a very
strong and positive correlation between corruption and environmental
participation at the macro level (Pearson r = 0.552). This result is also
supported in figure A5 (online appendix) which documents the negative
relationship between social norms against bribing and environmental
participation (Pearson r = −0.288).
In a next step we explore the relationship at the micro level. Table 6
presents the results focusing on corruption, while table A3 (online
appendix) reports findings focusing on the social norms against bribing.
In both cases we first present the estimations without and with Nigeria,
due to the fact that Nigeria might be seen as an outlier (see previous
figures). The results without Nigeria are shown in specifications (13)
and (18). We observe that the coefficient for the variables CORRUPTION
and NORM AGAINST BRIBING is highly statistically significant at the
1% level. The effect remains robust when including Nigeria in the
regression (see specification (14) and (19)). So far we have not controlled
for regional effects. Adding regional dummies in specification (15) and
(20) indicates that both coefficients remain statistically significant at the
1% level. These findings remain stable when adding the variables that
measure the importance of work, family and leisure (specifications 16
and 21) and in specifications (17) and (22) the number of children to
better control for opportunity costs. However, one should note that
marginal effects are only around 0.2%. Policy implications should be
treated with caution. When excluding transition countries we observe
a substantial increase in the marginal effects (0.7% increase per unit).
The existing literature on corruption and environmental policy supports
the conclusion that ‘institutional settings affect the way policy makers
respond to environmental concerns’ (Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2006: 11). If
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individuals perceive a lack of institutional quality they seem to be willing
to find alternative ways to pursue their goals. The actual process through
which societies will express their preferences depends on the trust that
citizens have in different institutions or channels to solve environmental
problems.
4. Concluding remarks
Since the 1970s, the number of studies on volunteering in general, and
determinants of volunteering, has been growing. However, there still exists
a lack of papers investigating the determinants of voluntary participation
in environmental organizations. The rapid growth of the social capital
literature inspired our efforts to consider this element as an influence
through the network dimension. In an environmental context, active
participation in networks (a dimension of social capital) seems to improve
the effectiveness of public environmental policies. This can be compared
with the finding that non-active forms of participation in environmental
groups do not generate the same environmental outcomes (Pretty and
Smith, 2004).
This empirical study analyzes a cross-section of individuals using
the WVS wave III (1995–1997) covering 38 countries. Our findings in
the pooled estimations on socio-demographic factors indicate a negative
correlation between age and environmental participation. Women report
a lower probability of participating in environmental organizations.
Interestingly, gender differences are observable in all regions except in
Western societies, with the strongest marginal effects for Asia. It seems
the argument that participation is based on individuals’ opportunity costs
is empirically not well founded. This corroborates Freeman’s hypothesis
(Freeman, 1997: S165), which argued that traditional economic models are
not always able to explain the observed pattern of volunteering and that
‘people volunteer when asked to do so for charitable causes’.
Furthermore, it is a promising line to search empirically for factors
such as political interest that have largely been neglected in previous
studies. Our findings show that political interest is associated with a
higher environmental participation. The results also indicate that there
are differences between regions. Interestingly, inhabitants of LATIN
AMERICA, ASIA and AFRICA have a higher probability of participating
in voluntary environmental organizations than those of Western societies,
but although we work with an extensive survey, regional differences
should be interpreted cautiously, as only a limited number of countries are
available for each category. Our results seem to indicate that environmental
participation is used as a channel for action in developing countries,
where weak and dysfunctional states mean that people may instead pursue
their goals through non-governmental sector activities. Such an argument
is supported when investigating the relationship between corruption
and individuals’ active participation in environmental organizations. A
positive correlation was found between the perceived level of corruption
and the environmental participation. This fact suggests that individuals are
able to find alternative ways to express their preferences and take action.
These results are also visible when focusing on the social norms of bribing.
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Environmental participation seems to arise in situations when there are
‘frictions’ or, in other words, when there is a need for collective action to
overcome the failures of governance. When the state is deficient, a good
stock of social capital can replace the operations of formal institutions and
enable collective action and cooperation to solve the problems of the group
(see Rose, 1998). Such a result is consistent with Bowles and Gintis’ (2002:
F423) argument that ‘communities may make important contributions to
governance where market contracts and government fiats fail because
the necessary information to design and enforce beneficial exchanges and
directives cannot effectively be used by judges, government officials, and
other outsiders’. However, the situation is different for transition countries
during the 1990s. In extreme situations where there has been a collapse of
institutional structures, this has led to a formal and informal institutional
vacuum, hindering private attempts to organize environmental action and
restore government effectiveness. If the institutional structures are changed
completely, as they are in transition countries, there is a rapid reordering
and replacement of institutions on a scale that precludes cooperation.
The energy required for negotiating the ensuing chaos crowds out other
forms of engagement. As explained by Kasper and Streit (1998: 3), ‘modern
economic life depends rather precariously on numerous written and
unwritten rules. If they are widely violated – as when society collapses
after a lost war or in internal chaos – many of the human interactions on
which we depend for our wellbeing are no longer possible (. . .)’.
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